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Abstract
The geographical location of Turkey in the Asia Minor places the country in a delicate geostrategic position determined by
its history, ideological structure, politics and energy economy. The Turkish government has defined its main energy strate-
gies with the goal of reaching 30% renewables by 2023. Key strategies declared are the prioritization of energy supply
security, the consideration of environmental concerns, and an increase in efficiency and productivity through the estab-
lishment of transparent and competitive market conditions through reform and liberalization. This article analyses the re-
newable energy (RE) transition of Turkey from a fully centralised energy management model towards a system of partially
centralization through the unbundling of utility companies. Analysis will utilize Michael Mann’s theory on the four sources
of social power as an alternative organizational means of social control and the interrelations of ideological, economic,
political and military power. The recent history of Turkey’s RE transition and government plans for sector development
will be investigated from a socio-spatial and organizational perspective. Furthermore, the way in which these socio-spatial
relations have been shaping electricity market liberalization and the preparedness of the state to share its power with
non-state actors is discussed. The potential of a centralised RE management model to inspire ‘decentralised’ RE manage-
ment in other geographies is considered. In conclusion, key factors in the organisation of the (de)centralised electricity
transitions are found to be dependent on history, geography, and overlapping relations of social power.
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1. Introduction
Energy autonomy (or dependency) shapes both the tra-
jectory of a country’s socio-economic development as
well as the nature of its international relations. Scheer
(2007, p. 231) describes the guiding concept of energy
autonomy as the goal ofmaking energy available in away
that is self-determined, not heteronomous; free and in-
dependent of external constraints, and outside interven-
tion. Scheer (2007, p. 231) also states that in the long
run, all these dimensions of energy autonomy are only
possible if renewable energy (RE) resources are utilized.
Sozen (2009, p. 4827) defines energy dependency as the
extent to which an economy relies upon imports tomeet
its energy needs. The trajectory that a country follows
from energy dependency to energy autonomy brings in-
frastructural, economic, geopolitical challenges from the
social power perspective.
Michael Mann develops his theory on the sources
of social power in four volumes written between 1986
and 2013. In these works, he takes the reader on a
socio-spatial journey, investigating different sources of
power throughout human history and suggesting that a
general account of societies, their structure, and their
history can best be given in terms of the interrela-
tions of four sources of social power: ideological, eco-
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nomic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships (Mann,
1986, p. 2).
A starting point in transitioning to RE systems re-
quires us to consider existing energy management struc-
tures and their respective histories. As briefly explained
in Section 2 of this article, the Republic of Turkey fol-
lowed steps similar to those presented in Mann’s theory
during the establishment of the republic and the forma-
tion of a centralised government through its Kemalist ide-
ologies. Later on, the country built upon its national in-
stitutions by developing soft geopolitical networks. The
military power did not have priority in the early years of
the republic.
Therefore, the transition to RE systems was initiated
with a centralised approach and formed around an infras-
tructural power. The social roots of state power had to
be preserved, but an energy transition initiated at the
same time. The socio-spatial context presented a chal-
lenge for existing institutional and regulatory structures
in preparing to transition to RE systems. The liberaliza-
tion of the electricity market had been initiated. The un-
bundling and privatization of utility companies were tak-
ing part both in the liberalization process but also paving
the way for new investors. In other terms, it was present-
ing an overlapping interest for both government (and its
institutions) and the new utility company investors as
well as private investors.
It is the geographical location of Turkey that has,
throughout history, prompted its governments to take
geostrategic decisions. When the Republic of Turkey was
established in 1923 with 378 deputies byMustafa Kemal,
a republican and secular constitution was adopted.
Ankara was selected as capital at the centre of the coun-
try. As Kili (1980) has noted:
The immediate objective of the Kemalist reforms
and the ideology of Kemalism was the realization
of a Modern Turkish state and society. Their ulti-
mate objective was bringing Turkey to a level even
above contemporary civilization. The Kemalist prin-
ciples of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secu-
larism, étaism [statism], and devrimcilik (inkilapcilik)
[revolutionism, (reformism)], were to provide the at-
tainment of these objectives. (p. 387)
It is this reformist ideology that has prepared the ground
for many geostrategic decisions at the national and inter-
national levels. As a result, starting from 1945, Turkey has
participated in the United Nations, and has since joined
theNorthAtlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), theCentral
Treaty Organization, the World Bank, the Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
the G-20 as well as regional organizations such as
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
(OSCE), the Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Co-Operation (BSEC), the Organization for Islamic Co-
Operation (IOC), and made an application to become a
member of the European Union (EU). These member-
ships have provided a worldwide network and consoli-
dated Turkey’s geostrategic relevance in world affairs.
1.1. History of the EU Membership Application and
Contribution to Energy Reforms
The lengthy accession process of Turkey into the EU
started with its membership to the Council of Europe in
1950 as the 13th Member State. In 1959, Turkey applied
for membership to the European Economic Community
(succeeded by the EU). The Ankara Agreement was
signed in 1963, establishing a plan for the development
of a shared customs union. In 1993, negotiations be-
tween Turkey and the EU began, and the Customs Union
took effect in 1996. This gave Turkey a strategic position
by allowing for the free movement of goods and exclud-
ing agricultural products by eliminating the customs du-
ties and charges (Delegation of EU to Turkey, 1995). In
1987, Turkey submitted a formal application for fullmem-
bership to the EU. The European Council gave Turkey
the status of candidate country in 1999 at the Helsinki
Summit, marking the beginning of the accession negoti-
ations (Delegation of EU to Turkey, n.d.).
The Turkish government application to becoming an
EU member state has prompted many chapters of ne-
gotiation, including Chapter 15 which focuses mainly
on the internal energy market, energy efficiency, RE re-
sources, nuclear safety, radiation protection and secu-
rity of supply. The development of RE policies were en-
couraged by the EU. Especially, the National RE Action
Plan published in 2015 that has the characteristics of a
roadmap was prepared in accordance with the EU direc-
tive 2009/28/EC (Ministry of ForeignAffairs—Directorate
of EU Affairs, 2020).
1.2. Structure of the Government
While Turkey has been continuing its path for member-
ship in European and worldwide organizations, its pop-
ulation reached to 82,886,421 in 2019. It is expected to
be 100million by 2040 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018),
holding an average age of 32 by the end of 2018. This pop-
ulation has been governed by a secular, unitary, formerly
a parliamentary republic which adopted a presidential
system by referendum in 2017 (International Business
Publications, 2018). This referendumproposed a set of 18
amendments to the constitution of Turkey (International
Business Publications, 2018). The new presidency be-
came an executive post with broad executive powers,
abolishing the post of the prime minister. It has also
called for changes to the Supreme Board of Judges and
Prosecutors (International Business Publications, 2018).
Another amendment resulted in an increase from 550 to
600 parliamentary deputies, representing 81 provinces
and a landmass of over 783,562 km2.
The new powers given to the president included
the right to issue decrees, propose the budget, ap-
point cabinet ministers and high-level bureaucrats with-
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out a confidence vote from the parliament, and di-
rectly and indirectly appoint the Council of Judges and
Prosecutors (Kirisci & Toygur, 2019, p. 5). These consti-
tutional changes created concerns in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (Kirisci & Toygur,
2019). Beside these concerns, a distinct economic impact
was discernible. Although European Commission (2019)
stated that the Turkish economy fell into recession in
2018, a total of 0.9% of economic growthwas reached by
the end of 2019 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2020). The
government of Turkey announced the growth forecast as
5% for 2020 at the Official Gazette as part of the Annual
Program of the Presidency.
1.3. Argumentation
Mann (1986, p. 13) defined society as a network of so-
cial interactions at the boundaries of which is a certain
level of interaction cleavage between it and its environ-
ment. In the same volume,Mann (1986, p. 14) states that
human beings are social but not societal—they need to
enter into social power relations, but they do not need
social totalities. Furthermore, in the fourth volume, he
explains power as the capacity to get others to do things
they otherwise would not do; that people would enter
into power relations involving both cooperation and con-
flict with other people in order to achieve their goals
(Mann, 2013, p. 1). Therefore, according to Mann (2013,
p. 1) powermay be collective, embodying cooperation to
achieve shared goals—power through others—and dis-
tributive, wielded by some over others.Moreover, power
may be authoritative or diffuse as well as extensive or in-
tensive (Mann, 2012b, p. 6).
According to Mann’s definition (2013, p. 1), ideolog-
ical power derives from the human need to find ulti-
mate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and
to practice in aesthetic and ritual practices with others.
Nevertheless, Mann (1986, p. 23) states that ideological
organization first arises in a more autonomous form that
is socio-spatially transcendent and it reaches in this way
beyond the existing institutions of ideological, economic,
military and political power. Finally, Mann (2012b, p. 7)
concludes that institutionalized ideologies indicate amin-
imal presence of autonomous ideological power.
Mann (2012b, p. 9) defines economic power as the
power that derives from the human need to extract,
transform, distribute, and consume the produce of na-
ture. Furthermore, he emphasizes that economic rela-
tions are powerful because they combine the intensive
mobilization of labour with extensive circuits of capital,
trade, and production chains, providing a combination of
intensive and extensive power and, in most cases, of au-
thoritative and diffused power (Mann, 2012b, p. 9). In
the fourth volume, Mann (2013, p. 2) argues that the
main organization of economic power in modern times
has been industrial capitalism, a system allowing for the
formation of markets into four main categories—capital,
labour, production and consumption.
Mann (2012b, p. 11) resumes the definition of mil-
itary power as the social organization of concentrated
and lethal violence. It is a type of violence that is mobi-
lized and focused (concentrated) aswell as deadly (lethal;
Mann, 2012b, p. 11). This form of violence is explained
as having both intensive and extensive aspects, as well
as the organization of defence and offense in large geo-
graphical and social spaces (Mann, 1986, p. 25).
Mann (2012b, p. 12) defines political power as cen-
tralised and territorial regulation of social life and the
basic function of government as the provision of order
over this realm.Mann (1986, p. 27) emphasizes that polit-
ical power heightens boundaries, whereas other power
sources may transcend them and can be involved in any
social relationshipswhere they are located. Furthermore,
he discusses the despotic and the infrastructural powers
of the state (Mann, 2012b, p. 13, 15) and he also states
that states project military and political power externally,
under the name geopolitics. Mann (2012b, p. 15) differ-
entiates between hard geopoliticswhich involve war and
soft geopolitics which involve political agreements con-
cerning non-lethal matters like, law, economy, health, ed-
ucation, the environment, and so forth.
This approach is seen as an appropriatemeans for dis-
entangling the complex socio-spatial context of interre-
lated and overlapping environments, economies and in-
stitutions in which RE systems exist. Its application will al-
low our case to be analysed in respect to the four sources
of power that shape human society (Mann, 2013) and
to emphasize the ability of human beings to pursue di-
verse goals and establish new networks of social inter-
action (Mann, 1986). Furthermore, it will provide insight
into when the establishment of new systems (such as RE
systems) to attain ideological, economic, military and po-
litical power will result in the formation of different net-
work relations.
Turkey’s vision and strategy for transition was in-
formed by the following question: “How to achieve this
transition for the benefit of all social actors within the
RE systems?” Multiple win situations were considered
to promote and expand RE systems, but the regulatory
framework and electricity market were not ready for
such a RE transition. The institutional structure and state-
owned enterprises were also not instilling confidence in
private investors, especially international investors who
could provide the necessary capital to develop the en-
ergy sector. The bundling of electricity utilities was not
creating an easy process for the realization of future
projects. Therefore, unbundling and privatization activi-
ties allowed for new ways of doing business and a more
balanced sharing of power between the state and other
energy market actors and creating new intersecting net-
works of relations for RE stakeholders.
The transition has played an important role within
the energy strategies of the government and that it pro-
vides a solution to the key challenges of a growing econ-
omy in a developing country. It enhances the security
of supply, decreases import dependency, and increases
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the share if low-carbon energy solutions in the energy
mix. Due to Turkey’s geostrategic history with its central
and unitary state, the RE transition legislation followed
a similar centralised path. However, it has incorporated
private and public investments by supporting the tran-
sition with parallel activities such as electricity market
reforms and liberalization. These new steps have always
been supported by the political parties in government or
those in opposition because they bring new sources of
income and jobs for the economy, the investors and the
people they are representing.
Other energy reforms took place before the 2015
National RE Action Plan. The first phase in the 1980’s and
1990’s facilitated a transition from state ownership and
control toward a liberal market economy, followed by en-
ergy sector restructuring and private sector participation
in the power sector (World Bank, 2015, pp. 19–20). Since
2001, the second phase of market-based reforms in-
volved electricity market development, as well as the le-
gal, regulatory, institutional framework. It re-structured
state-owned power companies, took transitional mea-
sures, placed unbundling of functions, and included pro-
visions for open access to transmission and distribution
grids. Furthermore, it created eligible consumers and
market openness, centralised balancing, settlement, and
trading arrangements, and furthered the development
of trading platforms and privatization (World Bank, 2015,
pp. 22–26).
This article analyses the geostrategic RE transition
of the Republic of Turkey in light of the four sources of
social power analysed by Michael Mann. Through the
analysis of the socio-spatial relations between ideologi-
cal, economic, military and political powers, it seeks to
understand the transition from a fully centralised energy
management perspective towards a partially centralised
management model through the unbundling of its util-
ity companies. It begins by briefly reviewing Turkey’s
current geographical, governmental, and demographic
situation with the history of the Republic of Turkey to
reflect on the reasons of the current RE development
strategy. It analyses the four sources of social power
as described by Mann in 1986, 2006, 2012, and 2013.
Section 2 describes the unbundling and the privatization
of the public electricity companies toward an open elec-
tricity market. It investigates and analyses the recent his-
tory of RE from an organizational perspective. Section 3
discusses the RE transition strategy and related legisla-
tion. Section 4 explains the impact of the unbundling
on the development of the RE projects from 2008 un-
til 2018. It investigates the development in the RE sys-
tems by comparing the data on the RE installed power
plant capacity and its contribution to the energy sector.
Moreover, it analyses closely the solar power plant and
wind power plant projects’ development over time, dur-
ing the course of the legislative and regulatory develop-
ment. Section 5 discusses the results of the statistical
data derived from Electricity Transmission Company of
Turkey (TEIAS) and Section 6 concludes with reflections
on the implications of centralised versus decentralised
RE project management.
2. Unbundling and Privatization
Mann (2012b, p. 6) reflects on the four sources of social
power as the organizational means by which we can effi-
ciently attain our varied goals. In order to achieve these
goals and meet the energy needs of the country, a se-
ries of restructuring and privatization measures (World
Bank, 2015) took place. The Turkish Electricity Authority
(TEK) established in the 1970s, and active in Turkey’s
electricity generation, transmission and distribution, was
first split into Electricity Generation and Transmission
Company (TEAS) and Electricity Distribution Company
(TEDAS) 1994. Later on, TEDAS was unbundled and pri-
vatized to reach efficient electricity market operations.
From the economic power perspective, TEK was the only
handler of this need to extract, transform, distribute the
produce of nature as explained in the Section 1.3.
The foreseen value of industrialized capitalism,which
is the economic power of modern times, had an in-
tersecting and overlapping interest with both political
power (central, institutionalized and diffuse) and ideo-
logical power (liberalization). The increased trade of capi-
tal, labour, production and consumption was enabled by
the unbundling and privatization of the electricity mar-
ket. For the governing power, this presented a way of
attracting foreign investment, encouraging domestic in-
vestment and attaining further financial resources while
contributing to the energy needs of the country.
This is how, over the course of the electricity mar-
ket restructuring, new actors appeared. The Energy
Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) was established in
2001 to regulate generation and transmission related
activities. The TEAS was unbundled into the Electricity
Generation Company of Turkey (EUAS) and the TEIAS.
The Electricity Trading and Contracting Corporation
of Turkey (TETAS) became the manager of sovereign-
guaranteed power purchase agreements and sales to un-
creditworthy electricity distribution companies (Deloitte,
2016, pp. 18–19).
One of the biggest steps in this transition was the pri-
vatization of the regional distribution activities of TEDAS,
resulting with its unbundling into 21 zones—with 21
different private distribution companies—from 2004 to
2013. As the 2015 World Bank report Turkey’s Energy
Transition suggests, privatizing distribution was priori-
tized to create confidence in prospective investors and
facilitate further privatizations and capacity expansion.
Nevertheless, TEDAS has retained its regional headquar-
ter for monitoring and supervision purposes.
Mann (2012b, p. 9) quoted what Schumpeter (1942)
famously called “creative destruction,” whereby growth
occurs through the destruction of old industries and
organizational forms and through the creation of new
ones. This destruction and creation of new structures
(Figure 1) in the energy market enabled the introduction
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Figure 1. The general structure of the existing electricity sector in Turkey. Source: International Atomic Energy Agency
(2018).
of renewable electricity generation by private companies
and individuals to be fed into the grid. Beginning with
one big state-owned company, twenty-five companies—
both state and private—were born. The structural break-
down of one powerful central unit of generation, trans-
mission and distribution has not resulted in the loss of
power. Instead, it has created a different model of man-
agement, with different energy market actors, without
losing the state’s control over the energy management
of the country.
TETAS, handling the electricity trade and wholesale
activities, used BOO (Build-Own-Operate), BOT (Build-
Operate-Transfer) and TOOR (Transfer-of-Operating-
Rights) models with private companies. In addition, in-
dustries were allowed to generate electricity for their
own needs and named after auto-producers.
Followed by the unbundling in the electricity mar-
ket along with the privatization of the utility companies,
privatization continued to accelerate. Figure 2 illustrates
the change in the ratio of the public versus private owner-
ship of the installed capacity. In 2008, the installed elec-
tricity generation capacity in the public sector was 58%
versus 42% in the private sector. A breakeven point was
reached in 2010 and by the end of 2018, the private sec-
tor owned 79.1% of the total installed capacity, with the
public sector retaining only 20.9%.
In the geostrategic RE transition path that the
Republic of Turkey has chosen to pursue, the liberaliza-
tion of the Turkish electricity market, the establishment
of the necessarymarket actors and the privatization have
built trust for both investors and consumers. Still, TEDAS
has not lost relevance and has instead changed its op-
erational structure to enhance RE projects at different
scales. Thus, the institutional and organizational power
of the state were not dissolved but changed their po-
sition through the unbundling of the utility companies.
A remarkable point from 2008 until now, is that there
was no change in political power. This was one of the rea-
sons why there are lot of interest from both national and
international investors along with state and non-state ac-
tors in the RE business. A desirable growth in RE invest-
ments was reached in 2019 which fostered sectoral and
regional economic development. This demonstrates the
role that carefully designed, planned and implemented
social power actions can havewithin a successful REman-
agement framework.
3. Renewable Energy: From Strategy to Legislation
The Turkish government has structured its main energy
strategies to focus on the following priorities: 1) promot-
ing activities to enhance energy supply security; 2) giving
due consideration to environmental concerns through-
out the energy chain; 3) increasing efficiency and pro-
ductivity, establishing transparent and competitive mar-
ket conditions through reform and liberalization; 4) aug-
menting research and development of energy technolo-
gies, and increasing the ratio of local RE in the energymix,
to increase energy efficiency and diversify supply routes
and sources for imported oil and natural gas; and 5) to
addnuclear energy to the energymix (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, n.d.).






























Figure 2. The distribution of Turkey’s installed capacity by the public and private sectors (2008–2018). Source: TEIAS (2018).
Geographically rich in natural resources, centralised
energy institutions and political structure, in 2009 the
country set the goal ofmeeting 30% renewables by 2023,
building on the RE policies which were being developed
since the enactment of the Electricity Market Law (EML)
in 2001. One noteworthy step was the introduction of
prosumers to the electricity market, allowing individu-
als to act as both RE producers and consumers. The Law
on Utilization of Renewables in Electricity Generation
No.5346 was passed in 2005, twice-amended and fol-
lowed by the Energy Efficiency Law No.5627 (Deloitte,
2014, pp. 18–19). The aim of these laws was to support
the use of RE resources in order to contribute to the di-
versification of energy resources, to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and to protect the environment (World
Bank, 2015) as well as to develop related manufacturing
sector to realize these objectives.
The RE Support Mechanism and unlicensed energy
generation regulations were introduced in 2011, allow-
ing for the unlicensed electricity generation from re-
newable resources of up to 500 kW. Additional feed-in-
tariff support for locally manufactured components was
added in 2013 for unlicensed electricity generation. The
government has acted with precaution in the develop-
ment of the capacity of RE projects. Unlicensed project
capacities were initially capped at 500 kW in 2011. This
was increased to 1 MW in 2013 and finally to 5 MW in
2019 under certain conditions. The feed-in-tariff for elec-
tricity production from RE sources was guaranteed for
10 years for unlicensed projects. Licensed projects were
obliged to follow a competitive tender process for allo-
cated lands in different regions of Turkey.
Beginning in the 1980’s, public utilities were priva-
tized and changed their operational models to promote
the use of renewables. The utilities were divided in six
categories, as seen in Figure 3: (1) Independent Power
Producers (IPP), (2) BOT, (3) BOO, (4) TOOR, (5) Energy
Production AS (EÜAS) and (6) unlicensed private own-
ers. In 2018, Turkey’s total installed capacity reached
88,550.8 MW, with each type of utility maintaining its
own stake in thermal, hydro, geothermal, wind, and so-
lar energy capacities. Furthermore, within this energy
mix, the unlicensed portion represents 6% of total in-
stalled capacity in 2018 (5,352.4 MW), made possible by
changes in the regulation of renewables, namely hydro,
wind and solar power plants which are up to 1 MW of
capacity each.
This ratio of 6% of installed capacity, growing over
13 years, shows the willingness of the private sec-
tor to contribute to energy generation when a sta-
ble/guaranteed support mechanism is established, in
this case feed-in-tariffs. In other words, the changes in
the institutional structures, and the integration of an eco-
nomic value system with the feed-in-tariffs, have led to
the establishment of RE sources’ economic power by cre-
ating an inter-relation with the rest of sources of social
power such as ideological and political. Consequently, a
win-win situation has been createdwithin a given geogra-
phy where the electricity beneficiary is the end-user, the
institutions monitor the security of supply and planning,
and private sector/contractors trade on a liberalized en-
ergy market. The economic power (industrial capitalism)
chain has successfully been created.
4. Development of Renewable Energy Projects with
New Policies
As outlined above, institutional changes to create a lib-
eralized market and fulfil energy demands had a dra-
matic effect on Turkey’s RE sector. The annual develop-
ment of total renewable installed capacity excluding hy-
dro from 2000 until 2018 has been shown in the Table 1.
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Figure 3. The distribution of Turkey’s installed capacity by the electricity utilities in 2018. Source: TEIAS (2018).
Although 28,291.40 MW hydro from the overall capacity
of 88,550.80 MW are accounted under the RE category,
there is a debate about their sustainability in different
geographical regions of the country and moreover, the
development of hydro power plants have followed a dif-
ferent set of policies that were developed prior to RE pol-
icy. As such, this article will focus only on the increase of
wind and solar energy projects since the passing of the
2005 law on RE policy (Law No.5346 on the use of RE re-
sources for generation of electricity).
Although grid-connected solar photovoltaic (PV)
power plants were not very widespread in 2011 when
the feed-in-tariff based support scheme was first intro-
duced, they have become one of the fastest developing
RE types in Turkey (Energy Market Regulatory Authority,
2011). This was facilitated in part by the government
price guarantee of 0.133 USD per kWh of generated so-
lar electricity. As an additional support mechanism, pro-
ducers utilizing local materials are provided with an ad-
ditional 0.067 USD per kWh, equalling a total sum of
0.20 USD per kWh under optimal conditions. This sup-
port scheme acted as an economic power stimulant and
added value to local investment, labour and products.
When the ambitious involvement of the solar energy
Table 1. Annual development of RE based installed capacity share in Turkey total installed capacity (2000–2018).
Renewable Total Renewable
Years Hydro Geothermal Wind Solar Biomass * Installed Capacity Installed Capacity Share %
2000 11,175.2 17.5 18.9 10.0 11,221.6 27,264.1 41.2
2001 11,672.9 17.5 18.9 10.0 11,719.3 28,332.4 41.4
2002 12,240.9 17.5 18.9 13.8 12,291.1 31,845.8 38.6
2003 12,578.7 15.0 18.9 13.8 12,626.4 35,587.0 35.5
2004 12,645.4 15.0 18.9 13.8 12,693.1 36,824.0 34.5
2005 12,906.1 15.0 20.1 13.8 12,955.0 38,843.5 33.4
2006 13,062.7 23.0 59.0 19.8 13,164.4 40,564.8 32.5
2007 13,394.9 23.0 147.5 21.2 13,586.6 40,835.7 33.3
2008 13,828.7 29.8 363.7 38.2 14,260.4 41,817.2 34.1
2009 14,553.3 77.2 791.6 65.0 15,487.1 44,761.2 34.6
2010 15,831.2 94.2 1,320.2 85.7 17,331.3 49,524.1 35.0
2011 17,137.1 114.2 1,728.7 104.2 19,084.2 52,911.1 36.1
2012 19,609.4 162.2 2,260.6 147.3 22,179.5 57,059.4 38.9
2013 22,289.0 310.8 2,759.7 178.0 25,537.5 64,007.5 39.9
2014 23,643.2 404.9 3,629.7 40.2 227.0 27,945.0 69,519.8 40.2
2015 25,867.8 623.9 4,503.2 248.8 277.1 31,520.8 73,146.7 43.1
2016 26,681.1 820.9 5,751.3 832.5 363.8 34,449.6 78,497.4 43.9
2017 27,273.1 1,063.7 6,516.2 3,420.7 477.4 38,751.1 85,200.0 45.5
2018 28,291.4 1,282.5 7,005.4 5,062.8 621.9 42,264.0 88,550.8 47.7
Notes: * Includes Industrial Waste; Unit: MW. Source: TEIAS (2018).
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investors and prosumers met with the existing trans-
mission and distribution line infrastructures, the institu-
tional structures were not ready to cope with this de-
mand. A few more years were needed to settle associ-
ated administrative changes. Neglecting the installations
made in 2012 and 2013, the installed solar PV capacity ac-
counted 40.2 MW in 2014 and over 5,000 MW in 2018.
Within five years of the scheme being introduced so-
lar production capacity in Turkey increased by around
12,500%, with licensed and unlicensed projects from the
land-based or rooftop solar PV systems feeding into the
grid. Open to both private or public sector, unlicensed
projects followed a determined permission process by
submitting required documents and/or permits from the
Ministry of Environment and Urbanism, the Ministry
of Energy and Natural Resources, and the Ministry of
Agriculture on its case. Several reports, documents and
calculations had to be approved by the civil engineers,
electrical engineers, and geology engineers to the util-
ity company in the region and/or to TEDAS. This permis-
sion process itself was already showing how the state
was not giving away its institutional and organizational
power. Privatization could make certain processes eas-
ier however it was not entirely meaning a true power
shift. Furthermore, another striking result is illustrated
in Table 2 with the capacity of the unlicensed solar PV
projects applied to the authorities totalling 21,592.41
MW in 2017. An additional 14,186.95 MW was rejected
by the authorities.
Froma spatial perspective, 21,592.41MW implies ap-
proximately 43,184.82 ha of land belonging to at least
21,592 people or to companies who have a land owner-
ship located outside of the urban areas. This constitutes
the land in the periphery which is not suitable for agri-
culture but was accepted for RE installations. Different fi-
nancing scenarios have been developed for these spaces
both for investors and/or for the land owners which re-
sulted in the high number of applications.
This expansion in solar PV projects clearly shows how
the use of social power mechanisms can result in multi-
plewin scenarios. The state institutions’ benefit has been
the generation of electricity generated from RE sources
which reduces dependence on energy imports, reduced
carbon emissions and creates investment and employ-
ment opportunities. This system allows both national
and international investors to generate income and en-
ergy in this booming sector. At the same time, prosumers
are given the opportunity to off-set their consumption
while increasing income.
Many wind power plants were established by indi-
vidual initiative before the RE law was passed. The first
wind power plant was built in 1998 in a village in the
Izmir province, a region with some of the highest poten-
tial for wind power in Turkey. By the time the RE reform
Table 2. The status of unlicensed electricity generation applications by the end of 2017.
Natural Solar Solar Geo-
Status Stream Biomass Multifuel Wave Gas (PV) (CSP) Hydro thermal Wind Total





Connection 17.90 16.92 77.91 3,026.43 12.38 77.73 3,229.27
agreement
done
Connection 1.56 5.05 123.26 2.20 132.07
agreement
expired
Under 28.57 6.00 10.41 134.57 1.00 180.56
evaluation
Installed & 66.72 2.40 8348 2,978.84 1.00 8.69 32.20 3,173.32
Activated
Accepted 49.38 2.67 52.04 548.43 0.08 7.57 5.57 79.44 745.17
Rejected 0.50 148.49 11.45 0.40 71.62 14,186.95 47.77 334.26 14,801.44
Total 0.50 326.06 39.44 0.40 320.84 21,592.41 1.08 78.62 5.57 564.4 22,929.30
Note: Unit: MW. Source: EMRA (2018).
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was passed in 2005, Turkey’s installed wind power plant
(WPP) capacity totalled 20.1 MW. As shown in Table 1,
this capacity reached 1,728.70 MW in 2011. It further
increased to 3,629.70 in 2014 and 7,005.4 MW in 2018
after the announcement of the feed-in-tariffs (Table 1).
Similar to solar energy projects, the first project imple-
mentations always took longer. Accordingly, the installed
capacity has increased drastically in the recent years. In
contrary to solar energy projects, however, the majority
of wind power plant capacity has belonged to licensed
projects. By the end of 2016, the unlicensed commis-
sioned projects were 10.4 MW and permitted but un-
der constructionWPP resulted in 81.7 further MW. Once
more the impact of secure financial supportmechanisms,
a stable economy and clear permission procedures is
clearly demonstrated in the rapid growth of Turkey’s
WPP capacity.
An overall assessment of the RE ratio may be derived
from Table 1. The RE-based installed capacity is 15.8%
of the overall installed capacity by the end of 2018, as
compared to the goal of 30% by 2023 (without taking
into account hydro capacity which might mislead). With
2023 the centenary of the Republic of Turkey, the ambi-
tious goals are to reach 20,000MWWPP (Deloitte, 2016)
capacity and 15,000 MW solar capacity (as announced
in the press release by the president of the Turkish
Solar Energy Industry Association on 14th January 2020;
GENSED, 2020). Whether these goals are realistic is a
matter of ongoing discussion. The potential for the rapid
growth of the RE sector in Turkey has, in any case, already
been demonstrated.
5. Discussion: Centralization vs. Decentralization and
Energy Autonomy
RE systems act as a tool because the development and
growthof a country is directly related to its energy admin-
istration. Depending on their interest and social power
relations, countries may use this power/energy whether
as a tool for economic development, by attracting in-
vestment and financial income, or as a development-
oriented tool to create energy autonomy, energy justice
and rural development in a sustainable way.
The integration of RE systemswithin a centralised sys-
tem or a completely energy autonomous decentralised
system will always be dependent on the given socio-
spatial conditions. RE systems incorporate environmen-
tal, technological, economic and socio-spatial aspects
and link central and peripheral spaces through socio-
technical practices in an environmentally friendly way.
Prosumers directly consume what they generate, they
off-set their energy consumption and sell the extra en-
ergy to the grid. Electricity which is generated from re-
newable resources in peripheral and marginal land may
be connected to the national grid network which con-
tributes to grid stability.
This article discussed the centralization and decen-
tralization of RE systems from the territorial perspective
of the nation-state. If one should seek to develop and im-
plement a completely energy autonomous system in an
existing electricity grid infrastructure, a financial source
is needed to buy the equipment and install the system.
This presents an intensive economic power. If this finan-
cial source is unavailable, moving to energy autonomous
scenario is not realistic. However, if this financial source
is missing, there may still be a potential way to intro-
duce the RE systems by using political and governmen-
tal power in a diffuse way and utilizing socio-spatially
transcendent ideologies. This situation may present it-
self in the form of industrial capitalismwith global actors.
Nevertheless, this system can only work if the social con-
nectedness and the exchange of power networks in vari-
ous forms among market actors is well-facilitated. This is
the reason why Mann’s social power approach explains
the dynamics behind the RE systems.
Sovacool (2016, p. 202) stated that transitioning to
newer or cleaner energy systems (such as RE) requires
shifts not only in technology but also in political reg-
ulations, tariffs and pricing regimes and the behaviour
of users and adopters. The recent RE transition history
of Turkey discussed in this article depicts a transition in
a centralised system within a strategic geography. The
preparation of the energy market, market actors, neces-
sary strategies and legislation were the key components
and a strong base for the implementation of RE projects.
However, the capacity of the institutions, the capacity
and improvement of the existing transmission and distri-
bution infrastructure needed to be upgraded in order to
meet the demand as well.
Within this context of a country with a growing pop-
ulation and economy forecasted in the strategic and de-
velopment plans, the social demand has been driven
mainly by investment and electricity cost-reduction per-
spectives. From one side, the intention of the private in-
vestor was to generate income and energy by harnessing
the power of the “free sun” and the “free wind.” These
investors have not been dissuaded by lengthy permitting
or licensing processes which kept on changing along the
implementation of the projects. On the other hand, the
intention of the government behind the support of RE in
Turkey has been the transition to low-carbon technolo-
gies, to reduce the import dependency on primary en-
ergy sources and to make a step in the energy auton-
omy by restructuring the centralised system. As Sovacool
(2016, p. 202) clearly states, the speed at which a transi-
tion can take place—its timing, or temporal dynamics—
is a vital element of consideration. And all energy transi-
tions take time.
Indeed, it has taken time in the case of Turkey, from
the energy-market preparation and planning phase of
the 1980’s to the 2005 reform and subsequent RE sector
expansion. Bayraktar (2018, p. 26) underlines that many
of these ambitious plans prioritize securing energy sup-
ply, reducing the adverse economic impacts of increas-
ing energy imports. They also make markets more com-
petitive, and increase investments in RE. Nevertheless, al-
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though these liberalization and privatization events may
seem promising, in between the lines, the authorities
have always been the ones who retain power.
Undoubtedly, while both small/large scale grid-
connected implementations were very popular, free sun
brought some energy autonomy for some stand-alone
system users. Inspired by the free primary energy re-
source, and with the introduction of the small-scale so-
lar and wind systems in the Turkish market, stand-alone
system users at home have benefited by receiving per-
mission to meet their own energy needs, free from the
grid and free from undue administrative burdens. They
have become the first off-grid prosumers of Turkey, and
they have not yet been quantified.
Instead of approaching two separate concrete paths
as centralised or decentralised transitions, where an en-
tire energy system and/or institutional structure needs
to be revised accordingly, partially managed models
could provide faster transitions to RE and enable prac-
tical solutions for people. Zuidema and de Roo (2015,
p. 71) state that decentralization in urban areas makes
municipalities responsible for developing their own envi-
ronmental policies and to strategically position environ-
mental interests in integrated local policies. Accordingly,
such strategic and cross-sectoral working requires com-
petences such as visionary thinking, communicative skills
and strategic planning (Zuidema & de Roo, 2015, p. 13).
In either type of management system, there exists a de-
gree of responsibility for the continuity of the system and
this does not differ much between urban and rural ar-
eas. A decentralised transition with any level of govern-
ment involvement may be seen as a kind of hybrid form
or pseudo-decentralization due to its connection to the
institutionalised power source. Indeed, whether an ab-
solute decentralization, an island model, is possible or
not within the existing governmental and social struc-
tures, their individual as well as their collective power
is debatable.
6. Conclusion
Michael Mann’s The Sources of Social Power was trans-
lated and published in Turkish in 2012 as iktidarin tarihi
(Mann, 2012a), meaning the history of the governing
power. It clearly explains how, through the use of the
combination of these social power sources and their in-
terrelations and intersections, a greater benefit occurs
for the governing power. In fact, the overlapping points
occurring in this RE transition create a socio-spatial in-
tensity necessitating regulatory means. The intersection
of these regulatory means in different organizational
networks define the nature of its centralised or decen-
tralised power structures.
More than a decade now, with the latest changes
in its energy policies, Turkey’s precautionary, partially-
liberalised RE landscape paints a promising portrait
in this specific geographical, political and institutional
space, while demonstrating the power of a centralised
government and the role of the state. In this case, the
centralised management model in a liberal electricity
market represents a grid-connected, feed-in-tariff incen-
tivised RE management transition model in a developing
country. From this, an appropriate management or self-
organisationmodel may be derived for the decentralised
electricity transition in other places. Indeed, from a
technical perspective, a centralised grid-connected en-
ergy system is a combination/connection of many decen-
tralised energy systems into a grid. What this means in
practice: Depending on the countries’ or regions’ or gov-
ernments’ sources of social power as discussed in this ar-
ticle, a different model of RE transition with different lay-
ers of liberalization or privatization or self-organisation is
also possible. This could in some cases facilitate a faster
RE transition than purely centralised or decentralised
process options.
Moreover, given the institutional structure and eco-
nomic drivers, RE transition can be seen as a political
power tool. While the privatization of state-owned com-
panies in general remains an issue, a national debate for
several reasons in the country, the unbundling of the util-
ity companies to improve the RE project developments in
a wider scale has proven to be practical. The 2023 vision
for RE in the energy mix was another tool to stimulate
the infrastructural changes for the government and to
encourage foreign investment in the country. Not only
the government, but companies, and landowners have
all profited in different ways. Nevertheless, the power re-
mained intertwined in the lines of the permission and li-
censing processes, or under other contractual formats in
spite of this unbundled scenario.
In terms of the geostrategic RE transition discussed
in this article to contribute to the thematic issue on
Governance and Politics of Electricity System Transitions,
Turkey’s transcontinental position does not allow the
country’s energy sector to be completely decentralised.
The energy reforms necessary to better accommodate
electricity generation from RE sources enabled private
consumers. The unbundling and privatization of the util-
ity companies, as well as the liberalization of the elec-
tricity market helped facilitate Turkey’s innovative elec-
tricity market. This made Turkey an international hub for
interconnected transmission systems between Europe,
Asia and Middle East. The economic power in the form
of industrial capitalism has been used in connection
with political power to promote and expand RE projects.
Perhaps, Turkey’s approach in expanding the RE use in
the energy mix does not represent a spectacular or un-
familiar form of encouragement by introducing feed-in-
tariffs. Nor, is the privatization of state companies un-
common. Nevertheless, this geostrategic manoeuvre of
the institutional and political power in high collabora-
tion with economic power and the intertwined, over-
lapping characteristics within the socio-spatial context
have resulted in the above-mentioned project successes
and continue being promising for the future.
In conclusion, as it is described by Mann (2012b):
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The IEMP Model is not a social system, but rather an
analytical tool form of an analytical point of entry for
dealing with messy real societies where these four
power sources offer distinct organizational networks
and means for humans to pursue their goals. (p. 16)
In this way, the organisation of the (de)centralised elec-
tricity transitions are dependent on the history, geogra-
phy and the overlapping relations of these sources of so-
cial power. Nevertheless, the answer to the question of
who is prepared to take responsibility within the given
country will determine how the social power will take
place for the (renewable) energy transitions.
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